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COLOR-BLIND RACISM IN GRUITERAND 
GRATZ 
KEITH R. WALSH* 
RACISM WITHOUT RACISTS: COLOR-BLIND RACISM AND THE 
PERSISTENCE OF RACLL\L INEQUALITY IN THE UNITED STATES. 
By Eduardo Bonilla-Silva. Lanham, Boulder, New York, and Oxford: 
Rowman & Littlefield 2003. Pp. 213. 
Abstract: In Racism Without Racists: Color'-Blind Racism and the Persistence of 
Racial Inequality in the United States, Eduardo Bonilla-Silva examines how 
whites use color-blindness as a tool to perpetuate racial inequality without 
themselves sounding racist. He asserts that white America's justifications 
for the continued second-class status of African Americans stem from a 
new, post-Civil Rights racial ideology that he calls color-blind racism. 
Bonilla-Silva argues that color-blind racism, which is founded upon the 
belief that race no longer matters, is currently the dominant racial 
ideology in the United States. This Book Review ratifies Bonilla-Silva's 
argument through an examination of the recent Supreme Court 
decisions on affirmative action in higher education. which demonstrably 
undervalue the persistence of racial inequality in the United States. 
Through the use of a color-blind ideology, the Justices mask the 
seriousness of racial inequality in the United States and may be hastening 
an end to racial progress before its time. 
INTRODUCTION 
On June 23, 2003, the United States Supreme Court in Crutter v. 
Bollinger reaffirmed the constitutionality of race-targeted admissions 
policies that intend to foster diversity in higher education.1 Read to-
gether with its companion case, Gratz v. Bollinger, however, it is clear 
that only the most limited use of race in admissions will withstand the 
Court's application of strict scrutiny to racial classifications.2 These 
* Staff Writer, BOSTON COLLEGE THIRD WORLD LAW JOURNAl, (2003-2004). 
1 Grutter v. Bollinger, 123 S. Ct. 2325, 2347 (2003); JOINT STATEMENT OF" CONSTITU-
TIONAL LAW SCHOLARS, REAFFIRMING DIVERSITY: A LEGAL ANALYSIS OF THE UNIVERSITY 
OF MICHIGAN AHIRMATIVE ACTION CASES 1 (Civil Rights Project at Harvard Univ. ed., 
2003), available at http://www.civilrightsproject.harvard.ed u (last visited Jan. 27, 2004). 
2 See Gratz v. Bollinger, 123 S. Ct. 2411, 2427-30 (2003); JOINT STATEMENT OF CONSTI-
TUTIONAL LAW SCHOLARS, supra note 1, at 1. 
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rulings come at a time when black Americans continue to face daunt-
ing barriers in their attempt to attain an education equal to that of 
most white Americans.3 Although the Court upheld a narrow use of 
race-conscious admission policies, it employed a color-blind ideology 
that severely minimizes the scope of racial inequality in higher educa-
tion.4 The Court's recent undervaluation of the persistence of racial 
inequality in higher education should raise concern about the con-
tinuation ofracial progress in the United States.5 
In his recent book, Racism Without Racists: ColoT-Blind Racism and 
the Persistence of Racial Inequality in the United States, Eduardo Bonilla-
Silva analyzes the use of color-blind ideology as a tool to perpetuate 
the second-class status of blacks.6 Although Bonilla-Silva's book fo-
cuses on the use of color-blind ideology by the average, white Ameri-
can citizen, the application of his framework to the recent Supreme 
Court decisions on affirmative action demonstrates that the ideology 
is so pervasive that it is utilized even by the nation's highest court.7 
Racism Without Racists examines the ways white America justifies 
the continued second-class status of Mrican Americans without actu-
ally sounding or appearing racist.s Bonilla-Silva contends that these 
justifications stem from a new racial ideology, which he calls color-
3 See Jack Greenberg, Affirmative Action in Higher Education: Conjivnting the Condition and 
Theory, 43 B.C. L. REV. 521, 525-29 (2002); Paula C.Johnson, Ad-In/Ad-Out: Deciding Victory 
alld Defeat in Affirmative Action Legal Contestations, 66 ALB. L. REV. 433, 440-41 (2003). See 
generally Gwendolyn Zoharah Simmons, Racism in Higher Education. 14 U. FLA. J,L. & PUB. 
POL'y 29 (2002) (asserting that affirmative action policies are being removed before their 
time). 
4 See Gmtz. 123 S. Ct. at 2428-30; Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2339-40, 2343-44, 2346-47; 
EDUARDO BONIl.l.A-SILVA, RACISM WITHOUT RACISTS: COLOR-BLIND RACISM AND 'filE PER-
SISTENCE OF RACIAL INEQUALITY IN '1'111': UNITED STATES 2, 9 (2003) [hereinafter BONILLA-
SILVA, RACISM WITHOUT RACISTS]. 
5 See Gratz, 123 S. Ct. at 2428-30; Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2339-40, 23'13-44, 2346-47; 
Johnson, supra note 3, at 440. Racial inequality in education continues to have a disparate 
impact on the lives of Mrican Americans; as Professor Johnson stated, "disparities in edu-
cational opportunities at the secondary and higher educational levels are among the socie-
tal conditions that limit the social advancement of many in the Mrican American commu-
nity." Johnson, supra note 3, at 440. 
6 See BONILLA-SILVA, RACISM WITHOUT RACIST'S, supra note 4, at 4. 
7 See Gratz, 123 S. Ct. at 2428-30; Gruller, 123 S. Ct. at 2339-40, 2343-44, 2346-47; 
BONILLA-SILVA, R'l.CISM WITHOUT RACISTS, supra note 4, at 4. 
8 BONILLA-SILVA, RACISM WITHOUT RACISTS, supra note 4, at 2, 3; see EDUARDO 
BONILLA-SILVA, WHITE SUPREMACY AND RACISM IN THE POST,CIVIL RIGHTS ERA 137-39 
(2001) [hereinafter BONILLA-SILVA, WIiiTE SUPREMACY]. Today, "[w]hether in politics, 
housing markets, banks, stores, corporate America, restaurants, schools, or universities .. ." 
racial inequality is preserved in a style labeled "smiling discrimination." See BONILLA-SILVA, 
WHITE SUPREMACY, supra note 8, at 138. 
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blind racism.9 He argues that ongoing racial inequality in the United 
States is perpetuated by "new racism" practices that are not as overt as 
Jim Crow racism.lo During the Jim Crow era, the racial status quo was 
justified as the result of the alleged biological and moral inferiority of 
blacks. ll Color-blind racism, however, does not rely on these same 
simplistic and overtly racist arguments}2 Bonilla-Silva asserts that, to-
day, whites justify the continued second-class status of minorities as 
the product of market dynamics, naturally occurring phenomena, and 
blacks' cultural limitations}3 These arguments, which appear even in 
Supreme Court opinions, mask the true status of blacks in the United 
States and support the fallacy that race no longer matters.l4 
This Book Review accepts Bonilla-Silva's argument that in the 
post-Civil Rights era, color-blind racism perpetuates the second-class 
status of blacks, and finds in the Supreme Court's recent decisions on 
affirmative action in higher education a disturbing manifestation of 
this new trend}5 In Grutter and Gratz, the Justices refuse to argue that 
affirmative action policies are still necessary because blacks lag far 
behind whites in education, a reality that runs afoul of the principle 
of equality upon which the Fourteenth Amendment was drafted}6 
Instead, the Justices hide behind color-blind doctrine. l7 By adhering 
9 See BONILLA-SILVA, RACISM WITHOUT RACISTS, supra note 4, at 2. Color-blind racism, 
"which acquired cohesiveness and dominance in the late 1960s, explains contemporary 
racial inequality as the outcome of nonracial dynamics." [d. at 2. Bonilla-Silva defines racial 
ideology as: "[ 11 he racially based frameworks used by actors to explain and justify . .. or challenge 
... the racial status quo." [d. at 9. 
10 [d. at 2-3. 
11 [d. at 2. For example, the belief that minorities were placed on this earth by God in 
a servile position, or that minorities do not have the mental capacity to vote are no longer 
as prevalent as during Jim Crow. [d. 
12 [d. at 2-3. 
13 [d. at 2, 3. See generally STEPHAN THERNSTROM & ABIGAIL THERNSTROM, AMERICA IN 
BLACK & WHITE 493-529 (1997) (asserting that while whites' racial attitudes have come a 
long way, racial inequality has persisted in a climate where changing public norms have 
forced racism to become more subtle); Keith N. Hylton, A Framework for Reparations Claims, 
24 B.C. THIRD WORLD LJ. 31, 34-36 (2004) (stating that the social welfare of black families 
remains well below that of white families, as illustrated by the disparity in poverty rates 
between the two groups). 
14 See Gratz, 123 S. Ct. at 2428-30; Grlttter, 123 S. Ct. at 2339-40, 2343-44, 2346-47; 
BONILLA-SILVA, RACISM WITHOUT RACISTS, supra note 4, at 13-14. According to Bonilla-
Silva, racial discrimination is still "an important factor shaping the life chances of people 
of color." BONILLA-SILVA, RACISM WITHOUT RACISTS, supra note 4, at 14. Bonilla-Silva also 
argues that blacks are still at "the bottom of the well" because of race. BONILLA-SILVA, 
WHITE SUPREMACY, supra note 8, at 11. 
15 Seediscussion infra Parts III, IV. 
16 See discussion infra Parts III, IV. 
17 See discussion infra Parts III, IV. 
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to the standard of strict scrutiny-in particular, the requirements that 
there be a "compelling government interest" behind the use of racial 
classifications and that the program be "narrowly-tailored" to that in-
terest-the Court corroborates Bonilla-Silva's assertion that color-
blind racism is prevalent in the debate over the worth of race-based 
government programs.18 How can we as a nation expect to narrow the 
gap between blacks and whites if our highest court's constitutional 
analysis does not properly account for racial inequality to the extent 
necessary to continue racial progress? If it is not a grave enough prob-
lem to warrant factoring into the Court's constitutional analysis of af-
firmative action, why should Congress or state legislatures worry 
about racial discrimination when enacting laws? 
Part I of this Book Review gives a brief overview of Bonilla-Silva's 
exposition of the ideology he calls color-blind racism. Part II establishes 
the urgent need for the Court to recognize racial inequality in higher 
education. By drawing on empirical data, this part of the analysis illus-
trates that racial inequality in higher education still is a serious prob-
lem. Parts III and N of this Book Review argue that even the Supreme 
Court employs color-blind racism in its two most recent opinions on 
the constitutionality of affirmative action in higher education. These 
sections analyze the Court's reliance on color-blind doctrine, and their 
utilization of what Bonilla-Silva calls the "central frames," "main stylistic 
components," and the "major story lines" of color-blind racism in 
America today. This Book Review concludes that, discouragingly, ad-
herence to color-blind racism in America's highest court may already 
be stunting the growth of racial progress in the United States at a time 
when racial equality is still an unrealized dream. 19 
I. COLOR-BLIND RACISM 
Bonilla-Silva intends Racism Without Racists to be a "wake-up call" 
to whites about the importance race plays in shaping the lives of 
blacks.20 Relying on interview data, Bonilla-Silva analyzes the various 
manifestations of color-blind racism with the goal of revealing their 
remarkably color-conscious result.21 
18 See discussion infra Parts III, N. 
19 See discussion infra Conclusion. 
20 BONILLA-SILVA, RACISM WITHOUT RACISTS, supra note 4, at n. Bonilla-Silva asserts 
that his book is "a challenge to post-Civil Rights white common sense." [d. 
21 Id. at 12-13. Bonilla-Silva relies primarily on interview data because of his belief that 
survey results do not accurately depict the racial attitudes of the respondents. Id. The in-
terview data for Bonilla-Silva's book is derived from two projects, the 1997 Survey of Social 
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Bonilla-Silva first discusses the central themes, or "frames," of 
color-blind racism: abstract liberalism, naturalization, cultural racism 
and minimization of racism. 22 Bonilla-Silva argues that the frame of ab-
stract liberalism relies on ill-formed notions of "equal opportunity" and 
economic liberalism to explain the racial status quO.23 The use of the 
"language of liberalism," exemplified by the assertion, "I am all for 
equal opportunity, that's why I oppose affirmative action," allows whites 
to argue against all measures to eradicate de facto racial inequality, 
while seeming reasonable and moral.24 Naturalization, captured by the 
idea that the current state of racial inequality is '1ust the way things 
are," is a frame that whites utilize to explain phenomena such as segre-
gation as a natural, and thus nonracial, occurrence.25 The cultural ra-
cism frame, illustrated in the comment, "blacks have too many babies," 
explains the status of racial minorities as a product of cultural deficien-
cies.26 Finally, the frame of minimization, reflected in comments such 
as, "It's better now than in the past," or, 'There is discrimination, but 
there are plenty of jobs out there," down plays the significance that race 
plays in the progress of minorities in the United States.27 Bonilla-Silva 
contends that whites utilize these frames both independently and col-
lectively to argue against measures to improve the status of blacks, while 
turning a blind eye to the reality of racial inequality.28 As the analysis 
below demonstrates, the Supreme Court uses two of these frames in 
particular, abstract liberalism and minimization, when it analyzes the 
constitutionality of race-conscious admissions policies.29 
Attitudes of College Students (SSACS) and the 1998 Detroit Area Survey (DAS). [d. SSACS 
surveyed 627 college students (including 451 white students) from three universities in 
different regions of the country. Of the 451 white students who participated, forty-one 
were interviewed. [d. at 12. The DAS is a "probabilistic survey of 400 black and white De-
troit metropolitan area residents (323 whites and 67 blacks)." [d. at 13. Of the 400 sur-
veyed, 67.5% responded, and eighty-four of these respondents participated in interviews. 
[d. at 13. The interview data from these two projects is utilized throughout Bonilla-Silva's 
book to exemplify the various manifestations of color-blind racism. [d. at 12. 
22 [d. 28-29. 
23 [d. at 28, 47. 
24 BONILLA-SILVA, RACISM WITHOUT RACISTS, mpra note 4, at 28. 
25.Id. 
26 [d. 
27 [d. at 29. 
28 [d. at 47. 
29 See Gratz v. Bollinger, 123 S. Ct. 2411, 2428-30 (2003); Grutter v. Bollinger, 123 S. 
Ct. 2325, 2343-44, 2347 (2003); BONILLA-SILVA, RACISM WITHOUT RACISTS, supra note 4, 
at 28,29,47. 
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Bonilla-Silva also discusses the style of color-blindness.3o In the 
post-Civil Rights era, public norms have changed.31 The linguistic 
manners of racism, Bonilla-Silva argues, have adapted to this change 
in a way that permits whites to justifY white privilege in an age when 
overtly expressing such views would be unacceptable in most social 
circles.32 He argues that color-blind racism, like all other ideologies, 
has created a group of "stylistic parameters," which provide it with a 
means of expression to the pnblic.33 Thus, Bonilla-Silva describes the 
style of an ideology as the "linguistic manners and rhetorical strategies (or 
mce talk)" that are used to express its frames and story lines.34 The 
style of color-blind race talk allows whites to adopt arguments that ex-
plain racial inequality without using racial epithets.35 
Bonilla-Silva focuses on five specific elements of the style of color-
blind racism.36 First, he points out that whites avoid using offensive ra-
ciallanguage when engaging in color-blind race talk.37 Second, Bonilla-
Silva provides an analysis of the "semantic moves" whites rely on as 
"verbal parachutes" to remove any risk of sounding racist.38 Third, 
Bonilla-Silva explains tile role that diminutives play in whites' racial dis-
course.39 Fourth, he illustrates how discussion of racially sensitive topics 
often produces incoherence in many whites. 40 Finally, Bonilla-Silva ex-
30 BONILLA-SILVA, RACISM WITHOUT RACISTS, supra note 4, at 53-73. Bonilla-Silva ar-
gues that whites rely on the style of color-blindness to "[tJalk [nJasty about lmJinorities 
without [sJounding [rJacist." ld. at 53. 
311d. 
321d. 
33 [d. at 16. 
34 [d. at 53. 
35 BONILLA-SILVA, RACISM WITHOUT RACISTS, supra note 4, at 53-54. 
361d. at 54. 
37 [d. Today, whites generally avoid using terms such as "colored," "nigger," or "Ne-
groes" to describe blacks. !d. at 55. 
38 [d. at 54. For example, most whites provide disclaimers when stating their racial 
views. [d. at 57. These disclaimers often take the form of apparent denials ("I don't believe 
that, but ... "), or claims of ignorance "I don't know"). [d. The disclaimers allow whites to 
save face if they say something construed as racist because they will have the ability to fall 
back on these rhetorical shields ("I didn't mean that because, as I told you, [am I/ot a rac-
ist"). [d. 
391d. at 54. Whites utilize diminutives to mitigate their racially biased opinions. [d. at 
66. For example, seldom do whites who oppose interracial marriage state point-blank, "I 
am against interracial marriage." [d. Instead, many whites that are against interracial mar-
riage assert, "I am just a bit concerned about the welfare of the children." ld. 
40 BONILLA-SIl.VA, RACISM WITHOUT RACISTS, supra note 4, at 54. Bonilla-Silva explains 
that this rhetorical incoherence (e.g., grammatical mistakes, long pauses, or repetition) is 
the "result of talking about racially sensitive matters in a period in which certain things 
cannot be uttered in public." [d. at 54, 68. 
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plores the role of projection in the articulation of the frames and story 
lines of color-blind racism.41 This final element of color-blind race talk, 
exemplified by Justice Thomas's opinion in Grutter v. Bollinger, plays a 
significant role in the debate over the use of affirmative action.42 
Finally, Bonilla-Silva examines the story lines of color-blind ra-
cism.43 He asserts that with the adven t of color-blind racism, new an-
ecdotes and personal experiences have developed that perpetuate 
minorities' new, but still second-class status.44 Bonilla-Silva argues that 
during discussions about race-related issues, whites often insert these 
stories, such as "I Did Not Get a Job (or a Promotion), or Was Not 
Admitted to a College, Because of a Minority," to "provide the emo-
tional glue and seal of authenticity needed to validate strong racial 
claims. "45 Indeed, in his majority opinion to Gratz v. Bollinger, Chief 
Justice Rehnquist relies on similar story lines to invalidate the Univer-
sity of Michigan's race-conscious admission's policy.46 Color-blind ra-
cism, in all of its forms, is particularly important in an area such as 
higher education, which, as the next section demonstrates, continues 
to suffer from racial inequality. 
II. THE PERSISTENCE OF RACIAL INEQUALITY IN HIGHER EDUCATION 
An examination of empirical data reveals that racial inequality in 
higher education is still a serious problem, and thus it is urgent for 
the Supreme Court expressly to recognize racial inequality in higher 
education.47 Although many in white America may believe that the 
4\ Id. at 63-64. Whites often project racism or racial motivations onto minorities to 
avoid responsibility for the persistence of racial inequality. Id. at 64. For instance, when 
explaining residential segregation, whites often state that blacks prefer the company of 
other blacks, and thus do not want to live in a neighborhood comprised mostly of whites. 
Id. 
42 See G1'1ltter, 123 S. Ct. at 2352, 2362 (Thomas,]', concurring in part and dissenting in 
part); BONILLA-SILVA, RACISM WITHOUT RACISTS, supra note 4, at 65; Greenberg, supra 
note 3, at 582-83. 
43 BONILLA-SILVA, RACISM WITHOUT RACISTS, supra note 4, at 75-101. 
44 Id. at 77. 
45 Id. at 72, 83. Bonilla-Silva proclaims that "[ w] ithout these stories, venting racial ani-
mosity would be un tenable." Id. 
46 See Gratz, 123 S. Ct. at 2428-29. As part of his argument against the University of 
Michigan's race-conscious admissions policy, Chief Justice Rehnquist explains that under 
the policy, person C, a highly qualified white student whose "'extraordinary artistic talent' 
rival[s] that of Monet or Picasso," would likely be denied admission to the University of 
Michigan in favor of person B, "a black who grew up in an inner-city ghetto ... [and] 
whose academic achievement was lower .... " Id. at 2428,2429. 
47 See Greenberg, supra note 3, at 538-46. At law schools that have eliminated race-
conscious admissions policies there has been a predictable drop in minority enrollment. 
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gap between whites and blacks in higher education has all but closed 
during the recent era of court-sanctioned affirmative action, the 
numbers continue to show a gap in access to colleges and universities 
between these two racial groups.48 According to the Department of 
Education, despite the fact that almost one-half of all whites believe 
that blacks have attained education levels equal to that of whites, only 
16% of all black adults are college-educated as opposed to 28% of 
adult whites.49 The United States is still a nation where the number of 
incarcerated black men substantially outweighs the number of black 
men in colleges and universities.50 
Part of the reason for the continuation of the racial gap in educa-
tion is the disparity between whites and blacks on test scores that claim 
to measure scholastic aptitude and intelligence.51 For instance, the av-
erage black student scores lower than 75% of white students on most 
standardized tests for admission into college, law school, medical 
school, and business school. 52 In some instances, blacks score below 
more than 85% of whites.53 Blacks make up less than 1 % of the top 
scoring group on the SAT and ACT, two of the most frequently-used 
college admissions exams, and are similarly underrepresented as high-
scorers on admissions tests for professional schools. 54 The Joumal of 
Blacks in Higher Education reported in a study that if scores on standard-
ized tests became the decisive factor for all studen ts in gaining admis-
Johnson, supra note 3, at 445; see Simmons, supra note 3, at 35 n.28; Ronald Roach, Taking 
Stock, Resuming Coune, BLACK ISSUES IN HIGHER EDuc.,July 17, 2003, at 16,19. 
48 Johnson, supra note 3, at 441; see also LANI GUINIER & GERALD TORRES, nIE MINER'S 
CANARY 47 (2002) (concluding that there is still a significant gap in educational attain-
ment among the races); Glenn C. Loury, Affirmed . .. for Now, BOSTON GLOBE, June 29, 
2003, at Dl (arguing that there is still a dramatic under-representation of blacks and His-
panics among top academic performers). 
49 Johnson, supra note 3, at 44l. As of 2000, only 17.8% of Mrican Americans over the 
age of twenty-five had completed four or more years of college, while 34% of their white 
counterparts could say the same. Vital Signs: Statistics that MeaSitTe the State of Racial Inequal-
ity, 36]. BLACKS HIGHER EDUC. 81, 83 (2002), available at http://wwwJbhe.com/vitaI/36_ 
index.html (last visited Nov. 20, 2003). 
so Vital Signs: Statistics That Measure the State of Racial Inequality, 40]. BLACKS HIGHER 
EDUC. 75, 77 (2003), available at http://wwwJbhe.com/yitaI/40_index.html (last visited 
Nov. 20, 2003). In 1999, the total number of black men enrolled in higher education was 
603,000, while the total number of that same class incarcerated in federal, state, or local 
prisons was 757,000. Id. 
Sl See Greenberg, supra note 3, at 525-30. 
52 Christopher Jencks & Meredith Phillips, The Black-White Test Score Gap: An Introduc-
tion, in THE BLACK-WHITE TEST SCORE GAP I, 1 (Christopher Jencks & Meredith Phillips 
eds., 1998). 
53Id. 
54 See Greenberg, supra note 3, at 526-27. 
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sion to America's leading universities, black enrollment would drop by 
as much as 80%.55 An examination of the disparity in scores on stan-
dardized tests provides strong evidence that the elimination of race-
conscious admissions policies would seriously diminish the numbers of 
blacks enrolled in higher education.56 This conclusion is strengthened 
by the disastrous effect that the removal of affirmative action has actu-
ally had on black enrollmen t. 57 
Recent statistics on student enrollment in public colleges and uni-
versities in states that have eliminated the use of race as a factor in ad-
missions put to rest any debate over whether race-conscious admissions 
policies are still necessary to ensure that blacks attain educational levels 
commensurate with those of whites. 58 States such as Texas, Florida, and 
California have found it difficult to maintain a significant black pres-
ence in their public institutions of higher learning in the wake of court 
decisions, referenda, and executive orders banning affirmative action.59 
For example, after Texas stopped using race-conscious admissions poli-
cies, the University of Texas experienced a precipitous drop in black 
enrollment.6o In 1996, the university enrolled 266 black students, while 
in 1997, the first year of race-neutral admissions, black enrollment de-
creased to 190.61 As a result of the passage of Proposition 209, a legisla-
tive measure in California prohibiting race-conscious admissions, black 
enrollment at the University of California in the years 2000 and 2001 
was about twenty percent below the level of black enrollment during 
the era ofaffrrmative action.62 
55 Theodore Cross & Robert Bruce Slater, Special Report: Why the End of Affirmative Ac-
tion Would Exclude All but a Very Few Blacks fTOm America's Leading Universities and Graduate 
Schools, 17 J. BLACKS HIGHER EDUC. 8, 8 (1997). 
56 See Greenberg, supra note 3, at 526-27, 538-46; Johnson, supra note 3, at 445; Sim-
mons, supra note 3, at 35 n.28; Roach, supra note 47, at 19. 
57 See Greenberg, supra note 3, at 538-46; Johnson, supra note 3, at 444-45; Simmons, 
supra note 3, at 35 n.28; Roach, supra note 47, at 19. 
58 See Greenberg, mpra note 3, at 538-46; Johnson, supra note 3, at 444-45; Simmons, 
supra note 3, at 35 n.28; Roach, supra note 47, at 19. 
59 Greenberg, supra note 3, at 538. 
60 [d. at 539. In Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir. 1996), the United States Court 
of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit's ruling that Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, 
438 U.S. 265 (1977), which held that schools have a compelling interest in achieving a 
diverse student body and that race may be one of a number of factors considered by a 
school in reviewing applications, was no longer valid precedent and that the promotion of 
student body diversity was not a compelling interest, forced Texas to end its use of race-
conscious admissions policies. Simmons, supra note 3, at 34 n.20. 
61 Greenberg, mpra note 3, at 539. 
62 See id. at 541. These statistics mask the greater decline of black enrollment at more 
prestigious colleges and the rise in less selective ones. [d. 542-43. For example, at U.C. 
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In an attempt to remedy this situation, some state universities have 
decided to institute so-called percentage plans.63 Percentage plans in-
crease minority enrollment at state universities by guaranteeing admis-
sion to all high school students who graduate in the top percentages of 
their respective high school classes.64 Thus, the policy results in the 
automatic admission to state universities of students from the top per-
centages of inner-city schools despite low standardized test scores.65 
This admissions policy has increased black enrollment in these states to 
levels commensurate with those while affirmative action policies were 
in place.66 There are several glaring problems with these plans, how-
ever, including their dependence on high school segregation to achieve 
the desired effect of increasing black enrollment.67 Percentage plans 
seek to solve one problem, low black enrollment, by relying on the exis-
tence of another problem, residential segregation.68 
Furthermore, despite state efforts to institute percentage plans to 
increase black enrollment in the post-affirmative action era, these 
plans have not been used in professional school admissions policies.69 
The application of a percentage plan to professional schools is diffi-
cult to envision because these schools admit students from all over the 
country and abroad, and colleges and universities are much more in-
tegrated than high schools where the student body composition is 
impacted greatly by residential segregation.1° As a result, black law 
school enrollment in these states still remains well below levels when 
affirmative action policies were in place.71 
Berkeley, the most selective of the CalifOI"nia state universities, freshman black enrollment 
fell fmm 252 in 1997 to 122 in 1998, and fmm 144 in 2000 to 138 in 2001. [d. at 543. At 
V.C. Riverside, however, which is much less selective, black enmllment actually increased 
after Califomia's ban on race-conscious admissions policies. [d. Without affirmative action, 
most blacks will be unable to meet the standards for admission set by the more prestigious 
state universities, but will still be admitted to schools with relatively low standards. [d. 
63 [d. at 538-46. 
64 [d. at 538-39, 546. 
65 [d. 
66 Greenberg, supra note 3, at 539-40, 545. 
67 See id. at 546-47. 
68 [d. According to Greenberg, in desegregated cities where high schools are inte-
grated, a top percentage plan would not increase minority enmllment at state colleges and 
universities because well-qualified minorities would generally fall outside the top percent-
ages of the class, which will predominately consist of white students. [d. at 546. 
69 [d. at 540, 545. 
70 [d. at 540. 
71 See Greenberg, supra note 3, at 541, 544;Johnson, supra note 3, at 444-45; Simmons, 
supra note 3, at 35 n.28; Roach, supra note 47, at 19. 
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For example, one year after the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeal's 
Hopwood v. Texas ruling, which forced Texas universities to end their 
use of affirmative action polices on constitutional grounds, the Uni-
versity of Texas School of Law enrolled only four black students, 
whereas before, it consistently enrolled twenty to forty blacks each 
year. 72 By 2001, black enrollment at the law school had increased to 
sixteen, but still remained below the pre-Hopwood levels. 73 Similarly, 
the School of Law at the University of California at Berkeley enrolled 
only one black student in 1997, which was the first academic year after 
affirmative action had been banned at the schooP4 Also, while black 
enrollment increased at U.C. Berkeley Law School in 2001 to four-
teen, this was still well below the level in the years immediately pre-
ceding the abolition of race-conscious admissions, which was consis-
tently in the twenties and thirties. 75 
National statistics on black educational attainment and the re-
sults of the elimination of affirmative action policies at select schools 
provide irrefutable evidence that a racial gap still exists in American 
higher education.76 These statistics also provide compelling support 
for the argument that the Supreme Court must recognize this gap in 
its constitutional analysis on race-based admissions policies.77 
III. THE SUPREME COURT'S RELIANCE ON COLOR-BLINDNESS IN 
GRUTTER AND GRA TZ 
Given the troublesome existence of a racial gap in higher educa-
tion, it is particularly worrying that the Supreme Court uses color-
blind doctrine to down-play the seriousness of the problem, which 
may ultimately contribute to educational inequality by bringing an 
72 Greenberg, supra note 3, at 541; Roach, supra note 47, at 19; see Hopwood v. Texas, 
78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir. 1996). 
73 Greenberg, supra note 3, at 541. 
74 [d. at 544. This one black student who enrolled at Boalt Hall in 1997 actually had 
been admitted one year earlier while affirmative anion was still in place, but deferred en-
rolling. [d. The ACLU Newsletter of January 28, 2000, stated that ural t the Berkeley School 
of Law, since the elimination of affirmative action .... The new students averaged only 
one point higher on the LSAT than the students admitted in 1996. The cost of one LSAT 
point was a 76% drop in admissions of African Americans .... " Simmons, supra note 3, at 
35 n.28. 
75 Greenberg, supra note 3, at 620 app. B. 
76 Sec id. at 538-46; Johnson, supra note 3, at 444-45; Simmons, supra note 3, at 35 
n.28; Roach, supra note 47, at 19. 
77 Sec Greenberg, supra note 3, at 538-46; Johnson, supra note 3, at 444-45; Simmons, 
supra note 3, at 35 n.28. 
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end to affirmative action before its time.78 In the summer of 2003, the 
Supreme Court handed down its latest opinions on the constitutional-
ity of race-conscious admissions policies.79 This marked the first time 
that the Court had critically examined the use of race as a factor in 
student admissions under the Equal Protection Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment since its 1978 landmark decision in Regents of the 
University of California v. Bakke.so Since the Court's splintered ruling in 
Bakke, Justice Powell's plurality opinion in that case has functioned as 
the model for constitutional analysis of race-targeted admissions poli-
cies.SI In a five-to-four decision in Grutler v. Bollinger, the Court, draw-
ing on Justice Powell's decision in Bakke, upheld the University of 
Michigan Law School admissions policy and declared that student 
body diversity is a compelling governmental interest that can validate 
the use of race as a "plus" factor in admissions.s2 In Gratz v. Bollinger, 
however, the Court limited the scope of the holding in Grutler by strik-
ing down the University of Michigan's undergraduate admissions pol-
icy because it was not narrowly tailored enough to advance an interest 
in diversity.s3 In a six-to-three decision, the Court ruled that the un-
dergraduate admissions policy was unconstitutional because it did not 
provide individualized consideration of each applicant.84 
Even more discouraging than the Court's decision narrowly to 
limit affirmative action in higher education was the Court's utilization 
of color-blind ideology in reaching its conclusion.55 An examination of 
78 See Gratz v. Bollinger, 123 S. Ct. 2411, 2428-30 (2003); Grutter v. Bollinger, 123 S. 
Ct. 2325, 2339-40, 2343-44, 2346-47 (2003); BONILLA-SILVA, RACISM WITHOUT RACISTS, 
supra note 4, at 2, 3, 9; Greenberg, supra note 3, at 538-46; Simmons, supra note 3, at 29. 
79 See Gratz, 123 S. Ct. at 2430; Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2347. 
80 438 U.S. 265, 320 (1977) (holding that schools have a compelling interest in achiev-
ing a diverse student body and that race may be one of a number of factors considered by 
a school in reviewing applications, but that an affIrmative action program may not, in ef-
fect, function as a quota). 
81 See Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2336. 
82 [d. at 2347; JOINT STATEMENT OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW SCHOLARS, SUp1'O. note I, at 1. 
83 Gratz, 123 S. Ct. at 2430. 
84 [d. at 2427-30. 
85 See id. at 2428-30; Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2339-40, 2343-44, 2346-47; BONILLA-SILVA, 
RACISM WITHOUT RACISTS, supra note 4, at 2, 3, 9. It is important to note at the outset that, 
when advancing the opinion that the Supreme Court utilizes a color-blind ideology, there 
is a distinction between the "color-blind ideology" depicted by Bonilla-Silva and referred to 
in this Book Review and the "race-blind approach" discussed elsewhere. See BONILLA-SILVA, 
RACISM WITHOUT RACISTS, supra note 4, at 2, 3, 9. The "color-blind ideology" discussed in 
this Book Review is a subconscious means of accounting for race in a way that appears to 
be race-neutral. See id. By contrast, the absolute race-blind approach holds that classifica-
tions based on race violate the mandates of the Constitution and actually hinder the quest 
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the Court's reasoning in both Grutter and Gratz. illustrates that the Jus-
tices rely strongly on color-blind doctrine by adhering to the standard 
of strict scrutiny and by using, in varying degrees, Bonilla-Silva's central 
frames, main stylistic components, and major story lines of color-blind 
racism to determine the constitutionality of affirmative action.86 
In Gruller and Gratz., the Court applied its strict scrutiny standard 
of review to the question of whether the respective schools' admissions 
policies were unconstitutional.87 The Court had previously held that 
the strict scrutiny standard of review applies to all racial classifications 
irrespective of the race of those burdened or benefited by the classifica-
tion.88 Moreover, the Court has described strict scrutiny as a standard 
that can be satisfied only by narrowly tailored means that further com-
pelling governmental interests.89 The Court's use of race-neutral crite-
ria, such as diversity and individualization, in the analysis of "compel-
ling government interest" and "narrowly tailored" in its recent 
decisions on affirmative action allow the Justices to sidestep a larger 
for equality. See, e.g., John Marquez Lundin, The Call for Color-Blind LalU, 30 COLUM. J.L. & 
Soc. PROBS. 407, 409 (1997). 
While the m~ority holdings in the Supreme Court's recent decisions reject the abso-
lute race-blind approach advanced by Lundin, Justices Scalia and Thomas utilize not only 
color-blind ideology, but also adopt an absolute race-blind approach to Fourteenth 
Amendment analysis. See Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2349 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dis-
senting in part) (declaring that race-conscious admissions policies in state education insti-
tutions are anti-constitutional); id. at 2365 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting 
in part) (quoting Justice Harlan's famous declaration in his dissent to Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 
U.S. 537, 559 (1896), that "[olur constitution is color-blind, and neither knows nor toler-
ates classes among citizens"); JOINT STATEMENT OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW SCHOLARS, supra 
note 1, at 1. For example, the Court in Grutterconcluded that the Fourteenth Amendment 
does not require color-blind admissions processes at public schools. Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 
2337; see Loury, supra note 48, at D1. 
86 See Gratz, 123 S. Ct. at 2428-30; GruttC1; 123 S. Ct. at 2339-40, 2343-44, 2346-47; 
BONILLA-SILVA, RACISM WITHOUT RACISTS, supra note 4, at 15-16. In arguing that the 
Supreme Court Justices depend on color-blind doctrine and use, in varying degrees, the 
various forms of color-blind racism in their opinions on the constitutionality of affirmative 
action, this Book Review in no way intends to suggest that any particular Justice is a racist, 
or that any Justice believes that race accounts for differences in human character or ability. 
See BONILLA-SILVA, RACISM WITHOUT RACISTS, supra note 4, at 172-73. Rather, this Book 
Review argues that these Justices utilize-perhaps even unwittingly-a currently dominant 
racial ideology, color-blind racism, that perpetuates racial inequality. See id. 
87 See Gratz, 123 S. Ct. at 2427; Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2337-38; JOINT STATEMENT OF CON-
STITUTIONAl. LAW SCHOLARS, supra note I, at 1. 
88 See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pen a, 515 U.S. 200, 224 (1995) (quoting Rich-
mond v.J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 494 (1989) (plurality opinion)). 
89 Id. at 227; GIRARDEAU A. SPANN, THE LAW OF AUIRMATIVE ACTION: TwENTY-FIVE 
YEARS OF SUPREME COURT DECISIONS ON RACE AND REMEDIES 55 (2000). 
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social problem-namely, the ongoing need for race-conscious admis-
sions policies because of the persistence of a racial gap in education.90 
A. Compelling Interest 
The Court's holding in Grutter, that student body diversity is a com-
pelling interest, resolved the debate among the lower federal courts as to 
whether Bakke was still valid precedent.91 Justice O'Connor's majority 
opinion affirms Justice Powell's holding in Bakke that institutions of 
higher education have a compelling interest in obtaining diverse stu-
dent bodies.92 The Court's opinion stresses the benefits of student 
body diversity for all students.93 The Court's reliance on diversity as 
the compelling interest that justifies the race-conscious admissions 
policies, however, is a convenient way for the Justices to couch their 
holding in race-neutral terms.94 
As evidenced by the majority opinion in Grutter, the Court's deci-
sion minimizes the scope of racial inequality in this country, specifi-
cally in the area of education, and takes a race-neutral approach to 
the compelling interest question in an effort to gain white accep-
90 See Gratz, 123 S. Ct. at 2427; GrIttter, 123 S. Ct. at 2337-38; Greenberg, supra note 3, 
at 538-46. 
91 JOINT STATEMENT OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW SCHOLARS, supra note I, at l. The chal-
lenges to the admissions policies in G/'utter and Gratz as well as the challenges to similar 
policies at other state universities resulted in significantly different outcomes in the lower 
federal courts. ld. at 1 n.4. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in 
Smith v. University of Washington Law School, 233 F.3d 1188 (9th Cir. 2000), the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit in Gl'lttter v. Bollinger, 288 F.3d 732 (6th Cir. 2002), 
and the United States District Court in Gratz v. Bollinger, 122 F. Supp.2d 811 (E.D. Mich. 
2000), declared that Bakke was still good law and that promoting diversity is a compelling 
governmental interest. ld. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in Hopwood v. Texas, 
78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir. 1996) ruled that Bakke was no longer valid precedent and that the 
promotion of student body diversity was not a compelling interest. ld. In Johnson v. Board of 
Regents of University of Georgia, 263 F.3d 1234 (11 th Cir. 2001), the Court of Appeals for the 
Eleventh Circuit ruled that although promoting diversity may be a compelling interest, the 
University of Georgia's race-conscious admissions policy was invalid because it was not 
narrowly tailored to advance that interest. ld. 
92 GrIttter, 123 S. Ct. at 2339. 
93 ld. at 2340. These benefits include training for an increasingly diverse workforce 
and society, increased cross-racial understanding, and more well-rounded classroom dis-
cussion.JOINT STATEMENT OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW SCHOl.ARS, supra note I, at 5. 
94 See GrIttter, 123 S. Ct. at 2339; GUINIER & TORRES, supra note 48, at 40; see also Gratz, 
123 S. Ct. at 2427-28 (holding implicitly that student body diversity is a compelling inter-
est); Emmanuel O. Iheukwumere & Philip C. Aka, Title WI, Affinnative Action, and the March 
Toward Color-BlindJurisprndence, 11 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 1,54 (2001) (arguing 
that "color-blind jurisprudence, although couched in neutral terms, is nothing more than 
an ideology employed ... to maintain the [racial] status quo"). 
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tance.95 Although Justice O'Connor does acknowledge that "race un-
fortunately still matters" and that "the diffusion of knowledge and 
opportunity through public institutions of higher education must be 
accessible to all individuals regardless of race or ethnicity[,]" these 
statements seem to be dicta and are not crucial to the holding that 
obtaining student body diversity is a compelling interest for an institu-
tion of higher learning.96 The Court could have simply stated that 
blacks still lag far behind whites in all areas of higher education, and 
that colleges and universities therefore have a compelling interest in 
ensuring equal access to public education.97 Instead, as to the compel-
ling interest question, the Court consciously invited Americans to view 
affirmative action as a benefit for all, not just for blacks.98 The Court, 
as it did in its decision in Brown v. Board of Education, should have ig-
nored whether or not its decision would enjoy broad acceptance 
among whites.99 The Court should have made a clear and unequivocal 
declaration that, until equality among the races is truly a reality in the 
area of education, institutions of higher learning have a compelling 
in terest in implemen ting race-conscious admissions policies. lOo 
B. Narrowly Tailored 
After holding that the University of Michigan's undergraduate 
college and its law school had a compelling interest in obtaining a 
diverse studen t body, the Court determined whether the respective 
race-conscious admissions policies were narrowly tailored to further 
95 See Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2339; GUINIER & TORRES, supra note 48, at 40-41; Iheukwu-
mere & Aka, supra note 94, at 54. "[P]opular animosity toward programs that are regarded 
as 'special' to black people means that [race] targeted programs will increasingly fail. , .. 
[T]here is evidence [however] that Americans as a general matter would support pro-
grams aimed at helping all people. , .. " GUINIER & TORRES, supra note 48, at 40-41. 
96 See Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2340,2341. 
97 See Greenberg, supra note 3, at 522,572,575. The Supreme Court should uphold af-
firmative action by declaring that it is a necessary means of improving the social conditions 
of blacks rather than couch its decisions on the constitutionality of race-conscious admis-
sions policies in abstract terms that mask the social reality of blacks in America. [d. 
98 See Gmiter, 123 S. Ct. at 2340. 
99 See 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954); BONILLA-SILVA, RACISM WITHOUT RACISTS, supra note 
4, at 182-85; Greenberg, supra note 3, at 522, 572, 575. The Supreme Court's ruling in 
Brown focused on the importance of a quality education for children of all races, and ig-
nored the fact that most whites disagreed with the Court about the importance of integra-
tion in public schools. See Sharon Elizabeth Rush, The Heart of Equal Protection: Education 
and Race, 23 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 1, 2-5 (1997). 
100 See BONILLA-SaVA, RACISM WITHOUT RACISTS, supra note 4, at 182-85; Greenberg, 
supra note 3, at 522,572,575. 
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that interest. lOl An examination of both Gruttcr and Gratz reveals that 
the most important aspect of a race-conscious admissions policy in 
constitutional analysis is the policy's ability to provide sufficient indi-
vidualized review. 102 In evaluating whether the specific programs were 
narrowly tailored, the Court once again took a predominantly race-
blind approach to its analysis.103 The Court in Gruttcr approved the 
admissions policy at the University of Michigan Law School in large 
part because it provides individualized review by seriously weighing 
other diversity factors besides race that benefit non-minority appli-
cants.104 By the same token, the Court in Gratz struck down the admis-
sions policy employed by the University's undergraduate program be-
cause it utilized a mechanistic assignment of points based on race, 
and thus was not sufficiently individualized or flexible to satisfy the 
narrowly tailored requirement. 105 The Court's framing of the narrowly 
tailored issue as an inquiry into whether the specific admissions policy 
provides individualized review is a distressing example of the color-
blind frame of abstract liberalism discussed by Bonilla-Silva.106 
In particular, the Court utilizes the frame of abstract liberalism to 
make its narrowly tailored analysis sound reasonable and moral even 
when the outcome of the analysis may serve to perpetuate de facto 
racial inequality.107 One of the foundations of liberal thinking is a fo-
cus on individual rights. lOB Through the lens of liberalism, group-
based goals, pursued through means such as race-conscious programs, 
101 Gratz, 123 S. Ct. at 2427; Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2342. 
102 See Gratz, 123 S. Ct. at 2428-30; Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2343-44 (stating that "[t]he 
importance of ... individualized consideration in the context of a race-conscious admis-
sions program is paramount"). Taking the two decisions together, "the most important 
inquiry into whether race-conscious admissions policy is narrowly tailored is whether it is 
flexible and provides sufficient consideration of all applicants." JOINT STATEMENT OF CON-
STITUTIONAL LAw SCHOLARS, supra note I, at 9. Opponents of affirmative action believe 
that "[t]he principle of racial equality reflects the need to treat people as individuals 
rather than as mere members of racial groups." SPANN, supmnote 89, at 8. 
lOS See Gratz, 123 S. Ct. at 2428-30; Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2343-44; BONILLA-SILVA, RA-
CISM WITHOUT RACISTS, supra note 4, at 28. 
104 Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2344. 
105 Gratz, 123 S. Ct. at 2427-30;JOINT STATEMENT OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW SCHOLARS, 
supra note I, at 9. 
106 See Gratz., 123 S. Ct. at 2428-30; Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2343-44; BONILLA-SILVA, RA-
CISM WITHOUT RACISTS, supra note 4, at 28. 
107 See Gratz, 123 S. Ct. at 2428-30; Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2343-44; BONILLA-SILVA, RA-
CISM WITHOUT RACISTS, supra note 4, at 28. 
108 See Scott Cummings, Affirmative Action and the Rhet01ic of Individual Rights: Reclaiming 
Liberalism as a "Color-Conscious" Theory, 13 HARV. BLACKLETTER LJ. 183, 183-84 (1997). 
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are viewed as detrimental to the pursuit of individual autonomy.109 
The abstract liberalism frame can be seen in the Court's insistence, in 
Gmtter and Gratz, on individual review of all applicants. 110 For exam-
ple, Chief Justice Rehnquist utilizes this frame and its focus on indi-
vidualism in the majority opinion in Gratz to rule against the race-
conscious admissions policy employed by the University of Michigan's 
undergraduate program. I1l Under that policy, according to Chief Jus-
tice Rehnquist, virtually every underrepresented minority who ap-
plied was granted admission solely on account of his or her race.1l2 
Thus, the university did not provide its applicants comprehensive in-
dividualized review, but instead, made race rather than individual 
merit the focus of the admissions process.1l3 The application of ab-
stract liberalism to the affirmative action debate erroneously presup-
poses that minorities are on equal ground with whites, and that mi-
norities would therefore be able to compete in a system that only 
recognizes individual merit.1l4 
The Court's application of strict scrutiny is a glaring example of 
the Justices' predominantly color-blind approach to the issue of race-
conscious admissions.1l5 In effect, the Justices do not place enough 
emphasis on the persistence of racial inequality in America's institu-
tions of higher learning.1l6 
109 See id. at 183, 190, 191; see also Greenberg, supra note 3, at 580. Opposition to af-
firmative action often stems from the belief that the policy is erroneously based upon a 
theory of "group rights,» whereas relief under the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protec-
tion Cl"ause is only afforded to those who are personally injured. Greenberg, supra note 3, 
at 580. 
110 See Gratz, 123 S. Ct. at 2428-30; Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2343-44; BONILLA-SILVA, RA-
CISM WITHOUT RACISTS, supra note 4, at 28. 
111 Sec Gratz, 123 S. Ct. at 2428-30; BONILLA-SILVA, RACISM WITHOUT RACISTS, supra 
note 4, at 28. 
112 Gratz, 123 S. Ct. at 2428-30. 
113 See id. at 2428; Cummings, supra note 108, at 190. Hostility towards race-targeted 
government programs, such as affirmative action, often originates from the mistaken be-
lief that the programs devalue merit. See Greenberg, supra note 3, at 582. 
114 See BONILLA-SILVA, RACISM WITHOUT RACISTS, supra note 4, at 28. Abstract liberal-
ism is an "tal bstract and decontextualized extension of principles of liberalism to racial 
matters in ways that preserve racially unfair situations.» BONIl.LA-SILVA, WHITE SUPREMACY, 
supra note 8, at 142. 
115 See Gratz, 123 S. Ct. at 2428-30; Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2337-47; BONILLA-SILVA, RA-
CISM WITHOUT RACISTS, supra note 4, at 28; GUINIER & TORRES, supra note 48, at 40-41. 
116 See Gratz, 123 S. Ct. at 2428-30; Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2337-47; Greenberg, supra note 
3, at 538-46. Greenberg illustrates the continued gap in the area of higher education by 
reference to statistics on enrollment from states that have eliminated the use of race-
conscious admissions polices from their public institutions of higher learning. Greenberg, 
supra note 3, at 538-46. 
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N. OTHER EVIDENCE OF THE COURT'S COMPLICITY IN 
COLOR-BLIND RACISM 
In her majority 0pullon in Grutter v. Bollinger; Justice O'Connor 
employs another frame of color-blind ideology by "minimizing" ra-
cism.1l7 Bonilla-Silva contends that color-blind ideologists minimize ra-
cism when they argue against affirmative action because they believe 
that race is no longer an important factor affecting minorities' educa-
tional opportunities.1I8 Opponents of affirmative action rely on this 
frame, for instance, to argue that racial discrimination does not affect 
the chances of admission for blacks applying to schools and universi-
ties.1I9 Although Justice O'Connor does not contend that race no 
longer affects the chances of blacks in the area of education, she mini-
mizes the significance of racial inequality in this coun try. 120 In her opin-
ion, Justice O'Connor asserts: "We expect that 25 years from now, the 
use of racial preferences will no longer be necessary to further the in-
terest approved today."121 It is true that minorities' positions in higher 
education have improved since race-conscious admissions policies were 
first validated by the Court twenty-five years ago, but to suggest that fifty 
years of affirmative action can repair the damages arising from centu-
ries of slavery and Jim Crow oppression grossly underestimates the 
struggles that blacks still face in their march towards equality,122 Al-
though her opinion upholds the race-conscious admissions policy at 
the University of Michigan Law School, Justice O'Connor relies, in part, 
on the color-blind frame of minimization to mask the true scope of ra-
cial inequality in higher education, and in so doing, gives credence to 
117 See Grutter v. Bollinger, 123 S. Ct. 2325, 2346-47 (2003); BONILLA-SILVA, RACISM 
WITHOUT RACISTS, supra note 4, at 29, 43-47. 
118 See BONII.LA-SILVA, RACISM WITIIOUT RACISTS, supra note 4, at 29. Many whites mis-
takenly believe that being white is not a socio-economic advantage. See BONILLA-SILVA, 
WHITE SUPREMACY, supra note 8, at 151-53. 
119 See BONILLA-SILVA, RACISM WITIiOUT RACISTS, supra note 4, at 43. According to 
Gallup, "eighty-five percent of whites believe that black children had the same chance as 
white children to get a quality education." Johnson, supra note 3, at 44L 
120 See Grutter; 123 S. Ct. at 2346-47. 
121 Id. at 2347. 
122 See Simmons, supra note 3, at 38. Terrence A. Taylor, chairperson of the Commis-
sion on Racism,Justice, and Reconciliation of the Episcopal Diocese of Southeast Florida, 
stated: "Sure Mrican Americans are doing better today in many respects than in previous 
generations. Yet we have not begun to scratch the surface of the damage caused by over 
300 years of slavery and nearly a century of Jinl Crow." Id. 
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the argument that there is no longer a substantial impediment to 
blacks' chances to compete in the admissions process. 123 
Notably, the Justices use these frames of color-blind racism in a 
non-mutually exclusive manner. 124 For instance, Justice O'Connor 
would find it difficult explaining racial matters through the abstract 
liberalism frame without also utilizing the minimization frame. 125 Jus-
tice O'Connor's insistence that all admissions policies be highly indi-
vidualized without allowing race to playa significant role seems reason-
able only if one overlooks the fact that, under any system based solely 
on individual merit, blacks will be at a serious disadvantage to whites in 
the admissions process.126 Bonilla-Silva contends that, by using these 
frames in a manner similar to "the way children use building blocks," 
opponents of affirmative action feel justified in saying, "I am all for 
equal opportunity, that's why 1 oppose affirmative action" because they 
can subsequently say, "Everyone has almost the same opportunities to 
succeed in this country because discrimination and racism are all but 
gone. "127 A5 demonstrated by the seamlessness and strength of the Su-
preme Court's opinion in GruUeJ; when these frames are bundled to-
gether, they form an "impregnable yet elastic wall that barricades" the 
nation from the unpleasant reality ofracial inequality.128 
Justice Thomas also utilizes the "style" of color-blindness in his re-
cent opinion in GrutteJ;129 Bonilla-Silva argues that color-blind racism, 
like all other ideologies, has created a group of "stylistic parameters" 
that provide a means of expressing its ideas to the public.130 Projection, 
on such parameter, is a linguistic tool that people use to shield them-
selves from guilt.13I For instance, critics of affirmative action often 
couch their opposition to the policy in terms of a concern over how 
1~3 See Grutler, 123 S. Ct. at 2346-47; BONILLA-SILVA, RACISM WITHOUT RACISTS, supra 
note 4, at 43-47. 
124 See Gruttel; 123 S. Ct. at 2428-30, 2346-47; BONILI.A-SILVA, RACISM WITHOUT RAC-
IST'S, supra note 4, at 47. 
125 See Gruttel; 123 S. Ct. at 2428-30, 2346-47; BONILLA-SILVA, RACISM WITHOUT RAc-
ISTS, supra note 4, at 47. 
126 See Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2428-30, 2346-47; Greenberg, supra note 3, at 538-46; 
Johnson, supra note 3, at 445; Simmons, supra note 3, at 35 n.28; Roach, supra note 47, at 
19. 
127 BONILLA-SILVA, RACISM WITHOUT RACISTS, supra note 4, at 47. 
128 See Gruttel; 123 S. Ct. at 2428-30, 2346-47; BONILLA-SILVA, RACISM WITHOUT RAc-
ISTS, supra note 4, at 47. 
129 See Grlttter, 123 S. Ct. at 2352, 2362 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting 
in part); BONILLA-SILVA, RACISM WITHOUT RACISTS, supra note 4, at 63-66. 
130 BONILLA-SILVA, RACISM WITHOUT RACISTS, supra note 4, at 16. 
131 !d. at 64. 
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affirmative action makes blacks feel about themselves. 132 The style of 
color-blind racism, and in particular, the linguistic tool of projection, is 
illustrated by various of Justice Thomas's assertions in lrrutter;133 For in-
stance, Justice Thomas states, "[Race-conscious] programs stamp mi-
norities with a badge of inferiority and may cause them to develop de-
pendencies or to adopt an attitude that they are 'entitled' to 
preferences. "134 In addition, Justice Thomas argues that race-conscious 
admissions policies are objectionable because they set up under-
qualified black students for failure. 135 Justice Thomas's approach dem-
onstrates that those who argue against affirmative action by adopting a 
color-blind ideology can make themselves feel less guilty about their 
role in the perpetuation of racial inequality.136 They accomplish this 
self justification by stating that race-targeted policies stigmatize minori-
ties by making people feel that the minority student must only have 
been admitted because of affirmative action. 137 Thus, the argl~ment 
goes, minorities are left feeling inferior to whites, even if they were ad-
mitted or hired because they were equally qualified for the school or 
the position. 13B 
Indeed, by embracing this inferiority argumen t in his own words, 
Justice Thomas adopts color-blind racism. 139 He states in Grutter: 
When blacks take positions in the highest places of govern-
ment, industry, or academia, it is an open question today 
whether their skin color played a part in their advancemen t. 
The question itself is the stigma-because either racial dis-
crimination did playa role, in which case the person may be 
deemed 'otherwise unqualified,' or it did not, in which case 
132 See id.; Greenberg, supra note 3, at 582. 
133 See Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2362 (Thomas,]., concurring in part and dissenting in 
part); BONILLA-SILVA, RACISM WITHOUT RACISTS, supra note 4, at 16, 63-66. 
134 Gruttcr, 123 S. Ct. at 2362 (Thomas,]., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
135 !d. 
136 See id.; Greenberg, supra note 3, at 582-83. The inferiority argument is even more 
unfounded because generalizations about the stigmatizing or stereotyping effect of af-
firmative action policies are supported by little or no empirical data. See Greenberg, supra 
note 3, at 583-87. 
137 See id. at 582-83; see also Cummings, supra note 108, at 238-39 (declaring that it is a 
social good for race always to be important in state decision-making because it promotes 
the value of race and thus diminishes any stigmatizing effect affirmative action may pro-
duce). 
138 See Cummings, supra note 108, at 238-39; Greenberg, supra note 3, at 582-83. 
139 See GrUttC1; 123 S. Ct. at 2362 (Thomas,]., concurring in part and dissenting in 
part); BONIU,A-SILVA, RACISM WITHOUT RACISTS, supra note 4, at 16, 63-66. 
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asking the question itself unfairly marks those blacks who 
would succeed without discrimination}40 
463 
As Justice Thomas's opinion demonstrates, the style of color-blind ra-
cism allows individuals to maintain a color-blind image as they ad-
vance positions that perpetuate racial inequality and white privi-
lege. l41 In reality, however, whites are the ones who receive preference 
based upon their race because of their history of comparative wealth 
and social privilege, and thus should feel inferior because the market 
is so heavily tilted in their favor. l42 
Furthermore, the Supreme Court perpetuates color-blind racism 
by utilizing the ideology's major "story lines" to invoke sympathy that 
affirmative action hurts innocent people who merit being admitted. 143 
When making points on race-related issues, individuals who utilize 
color-blind racism often insert these stories, which validate strong ra-
cial claims. l44 Similar to the common story of, "I Did Not Get a Job 
(or a Promotion), or Was Not Admitted to a College, Because of a 
Minority," Chief Justice Rehnquist, in his majority opinion in Gratz v. 
Bollinge1; emphasizes that highly qualified whites are hurt by the race-
conscious admissions policy utilized by the University of Michigan. l45 
In a hypothetical, Chief Justice Rehnquist explains that person C, a 
highly qualified white student whose "extraordinary artistic talent ri-
val[s] that of Monet or Picasso," would likely be denied admissions to 
the University of Michigan in favor of person B, "a black who grew up 
in an inner-city ghetto ... [and] whose academic achievement was 
lower .... "146 The Chief Justice stresses that this example illustrates 
what is wrong with the admissions system at issue in Gratz}47 
140 Grutter; 123 S. Ct. at 2362 (Thomas,]., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
HI See id. at 2352, 2362 (Thomas,]., concurring in part and dissenting in part); 
BONILLA-SILVA, RACISM WITHOUT RACISTS, supra note 4, at 70. 
142 BONILLA-SILVA, RACISM WITHOUT RACIST'S, supm note 4, at 65. "Justice Thomas' ri-
diculous stigma argument conveniently overlook[sl the fact that stigma to Mrican-Americans 
did not start with affIrmative action, but has been part of the history of our obsession with 
the color of a person's skin." Iheukwumere & Aka, supra note 94, at 34. 
143 See Gratz v. Bollinger, 123 S. Ct. 2411, 2428-29 (2003); BONILLA-SILVA, RACISM 
WITHOUT RACISTS, supm note 4, at 77, 83. Opponents to affirmative action view race-
conscious programs as "punishing innocent whites who were not the perpetrators of pre-
B1Vwn racial discrimination .... " SPANN, supm note 89, at 8 (citing Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 
347 U.S. 483 (1954». 
144 BONILLA-SILVA, RACISM WITHOUT RACISTS, supm note 4, at 72. 
145 See Gratz, 123 S. Ct. at 2428-29; BONILLA-SILVA, RACISM WnnOUT RACISTS, supm 
note 4, at 83. 
146 Gratz, 123 S. Ct. at 2428, 2429 (internal quotations omitted). 
147 [d. at 2429. 
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The sympathy that Chief Justice Rehnquist attempts to invoke for 
"innocent" whites who are allegedly hurt by affirmative action policies 
is undeserved.148 For example, in the context of college admissions, a 
study of five highly selective schools concluded that if whites filled all 
the open seats created by eliminating each school's respective affirma-
tive action policy, "the overall white probability of admission would 
rise by only one and one-half percentage points .... "149 Statistics such 
as these led one commentator to compare bitterness toward race-
targeted government programs to resentment against setting aside 
parking spaces for the handicapped.150 According to the analogy, 
eliminating a reserved space would have only a minuscule effect on 
parking options for non-disabled drivers, but the sight of the open 
space would frustrate many passing motorists looking for a space to 
park.151 Many are likely to believe, mistakenly, that they would have 
parked in the space had it not been reserved.152 Thus, empirical data 
reveals that the anti-affirmative action argument advanced by the "I 
Did Not Get a Job (or a Promotion), or Was Not Admitted to a Col-
lege, Because of a Minority" story line is flawed and contributes to 
masking the racial reality in the United States.153 
In the Court's recent opinions on affirmative action, the use of 
the story lines of color-blind racism, like the use of color-blind frames 
and style, undervalue the breadth and depth of racism.154 The opin-
ions place a color-blind blanket over a constitutional debate that de-
mands acknowledgement that the ideal of equality among the races is 
still a distant dream.155 The Court's adoption of a color-blind ideology 
not only masks the irrefutable existence of a stark racial gap in higher 
148 See id. at 2428-29; BONIl.l.A-SIl.VA, RACISM WrI1IOUT RACISTS, supra note 4, at 83-
84. 
149 Greenberg, supra note 3, at 589; see also Simmons, supra note 3, at 39 (arguing that 
the myth that whites have been hurt and displaced by affirmative action policies is also 
unsupported in the context of employment). 
150 Thomas]. Kane, Racial and Ethnic Preferences in College Admissions, in TIlE BLACK-
WHITE TEST SCORE GAP, supra note 52, at 431,453; see also Greenberg, supra note 3, at 589. 
151 Kane, supra note 150, at 453; see also Greenberg, supra note 3, at 589. 
152 Kane, supra note 150, at 453; see also Greenberg, supra note 3, at 589. 
153 See BONILLA-SIl.VA, RACISM WITHOUT RACISTS, supra note 4, at 83-84; Greenberg, 
supra note 3, at 589. 
154 See Gratz, 123 S. Ct. at 2428-30; Grotter, 123 S. Ct. at 2339-40, 2343-44, 2346-47; 
BONILl.A-SILVA, RACISM WITHOUT RACISTS, supra note 4, at 77; Greenberg, supra note 3, at 
538-46;Johnson, supra note 3, at 444-45; Charles]. Ogletree, Tulsa Reparations: The Survi-
vors'Story, 24 B.C. THIRD WORLD LJ. 13,28-29 (2004); Simmons, supra note 3, at 35 n.28. 
155 See Gratz, 123 S. Ct. at 2428-30; Grotter, 123 S. Ct. at 2339-40, 2343-44, 2346-47; 
Greenberg, supra note 3, at 538-46; Johnson, supra note 3, at 444-45; Simmons, supra note 
3, at 35 n.28. 
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education, but it may also ultimately worsen this gap by bringing a 
premature end to affirmative action. 156 
CONCLUSION 
In his book, Racism Without Racists: Color-Blind Racism and the Persis-
tence of Racial Inequality in the United States, Eduardo Bonilla-Silva alerts 
readers to the danger that a color-blind ideology will soon pervade dis-
cussions of race in the United States.157 The mechanisms of color-blind 
racism allow whites to advance positions that assure the perpetuation of 
white privilege.158 Under this color-blind guise, the arguments oppos-
ing affirmative action sound reasonable and moral. 159 Yet individuals 
employ the frames, style, and story lines of color-blind racism to mask 
the fact that blacks still hold a second-class status in America. 160 Thus, 
color-blind racism facilitates the perpetuation of racial inequality by 
obscuring the fact that there is even a problem to fiX.161 
Although Bonilla-Silva only examines the use of color-blindness by 
the average white American citizen, an examination of the two recent 
Supreme Court decisions on affirmative action reveals that even the 
Court at times employs a color-blind ideology and minimizes the seri-
ousness of the racial gap that still exists in the United States. 162 
Throughout the Court's opinions ill Crutter v. Bollinger and Gratz v. Bol-
linge1; the Justices refuse to discuss race at a time when a discussion of 
racial inequality is imperative to highlight the continued importance of 
affirmative action to the black community.163 The Court's reluctance to 
156 See Gratz. 123 S. Ct. at 2428-30; Gruttel; 123 S. Ct. at 2339-40, 2343-44, 2346-47; 
BONILLA-SILVA, RACISM WITHOUT RACISTS, supra note 4, at 2, 3, 9; Greenberg, supra note 
3, at 538-46; Simmons, supm note 3, at 29. 
157 BONILLA-SILVA, RACISM WITHOUT RACISTS, supra note 4, at 2, 3. 
158Id. 
159 Id. at 28. 
160 Id. at 28-29, 53-54, 77. 
161 Seeid. at 13-14. 
162 See Gratz Y. Bollinger, 123 S. Ct. 2411, 2428-30 (2003); Grutter Y. Bollinger, 123 S. 
Ct. 2325, 2339-40, 2343-44, 2346-47 (2003); BONILLA-SILVA, RACISM WITHOUT RACISTS, 
supra note 4, at 12-13. 
163 SeeJohnson, supra note 3, at 442. Johnson calls upon the Court to include a discus-
sion of racial inequality in its recent opinions on affirmative action. Id. The only Justice 
whose recent opinions stress the inlportance of closing the racial gap in higher education 
is Justice Ginsburg. See Gratz, 123 S. Ct. at 2442-46 (Ginsburg,]., dissenting); Grutter, 123 S. 
Ct. at 2347-49 (Ginsburg,]., concurring). Justice Ginsburg's opinions, and in particular, 
her dissenting opinion in Gmtz, should be used by the Court as a foundation for a more 
color-conscious analysis of the constitutionality of affirmative action. See Gratz, 123 S. Ct. at 
2442-46 (Ginsburg,]., dissenting); Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2347-49 (Ginsburg,]., concur-
ring). Furthermore, in her dissent to Adm'and Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, Justice Ginsburg 
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recognize the scope of racial inequality, and its insistence on couching 
its decisions in race-blind terms, assures wide-spread public approval 
and, unfortunately, assures blacks a second-class status. 1M 
The Court seems to have forgotten that the purpose of affirmative 
action is to remedy historic wrongs that have been committed against 
African Americans.I65 Make no mistake about it: centuries of slavery, 
oppression, and discrimination cannot be erased by twenty-five years of 
Court-sanctioned affirmative action.166 Although the Court in Gtutter 
approves of a limited use of race-conscious admissions policies, the 
Court's undervaluation of the African-American community's continued 
need for affirmative action--especially in higher education, where it is so 
vital to improving the community's social conditions-misleads one into 
believing that affirmative action need not be around for long.167 
"Vhen race-talk is taken out of the affirmative action debate, the 
most important reasons for the program are 10st.I68 VVhile diversity is 
certainly an important goal, it should not come before the goal of as-
suring that each individual in this country is guaranteed equal oppor-
tunity irrespective of race. 169 The Court's use of color-blindness guts its 
recent opinions on affirmative action of the most compelling reason 
for the continuation of race-targeted programs: racial inequalityPO As a 
result, Justice O'Connor's forecast, that affirmative action will end in 
also proclaims that affIrmative action programs are necessary because of the persistence of 
racial inequality in the United States. See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pen a, 515 U.S. 200, 
270-75 (1995) (Ginsburg,J., dissenting). 
164 See Gratz, 123 S. Ct. at 2428-30; Crutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2339-40, 2343-44, 2346-47; 
GUINIER & TORRES, supra note 48, at 40-41. 
165 See Gratz, 123 S. Ct. at 2428-30; Crutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2339-40, 2343-44, 2346-47; 
Simmons, supra note 3, at 32-33. Americans "have forgotten the intent of affirmative ac-
tion is to correct and to remedy historic wrongs and [seem] to believe the right-wing 
rhetoric against the policies and [are] supporting a return to the pre-civil-rights status quo, 
which upholds white skin privilege." Simmons, supra note 3, at 32-33. 
166 See id. at 38. 
167 See Crutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2347; Greenberg, supra note 3, at 607-08. Professor Green-
herg contends that affirmative action in higher education aids blacks in improving their 
overall social conditions. Greenberg, supra note 3, at 607-08. 
168 See BONILLA-SILVA, RACISM WITHOUT RACISTS, supra note 4, at 182-85; Greenberg, 
supra note 3, at 604-08. MfIrmative action can be defended as constitutional by viewing 
the policy as a means of improving the social standing of blacks. See Greenberg, supra note 
3, at 607-08. 
169 See BONILLA-SILVA, RACISM WITHOUT RACISTS, supra note 4, 182-85; Greenberg, su-
pra note 3, at 604-08. 
170 See Gratz, 123 S. Ct. at 2428-30; GJ"Utter, 123 S. Ct. at 2339-40, 2343-44, 2346-47; 
BONILLA-SILVA, RACISM WITHOUT RACISTS, supra note 4, at 2, 3. 
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another twenty-five years, is likely to come true long before our country 
has made the gains necessary to ensure racial equality.i7l 
171 See Grutter, 123 S. Ct. 2346-47; Loury, supra note 48, at Dl. As Professor Loury 
noted in reference to Justice O'Connor's "twenty-five years" prediction: 
Although the legal significance of ... Uustice O'Connor's] speculation is un-
certain, the fact that this statement appears in the opinion should serve as a 
dear warning to supporters of affirmative action. We must not rest on our 
laurels. This recent victory may well be our last, and its benefits may be short-
lived. Unless over the course of the next generation the dramatic underrep-
resentation of blacks and Hispanics among top academic performers is 
remedied, their access to selective institutions of higher education may one 
day be severely curtailed. 
Loury, supra note 48, at Dl. 

